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Abstract We characterize a class of envy-as-inequity measures. There are three key
axioms. Decomposability requires that overall envy is the sum of the envy within
and between subgroups. The other two axioms deal with the two-individual setting
and specify how the envy measure should react to simple changes in the individuals’
commodity bundles. The characterized class measures how much one individual envies
another individual by the relative utility difference (using the envious’ utility function)
between the bundle of the envied and the bundle of the envious, where the utility
function that must be used to represent the ordinal preferences is the ‘ray’ utility
function. The class measures overall envy by the sum of these (transformed) relative
utility differences. We discuss our results in the light of previous contributions to envy
measurement and multidimensional inequality measurement.
1 Introduction
An allocation is envy-free if no individual prefers another individual’s commodity
bundle to his own. The envy-freeness criterion was introduced to capture the ethical
ideal of equality in a setting of ordinal preferences that are not comparable between
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individuals.1 Indeed, an envy-free allocation achieves equality in the sense that it
leaves no individual worse off (in his own judgment) than any other individual. An
alternative egalitarian interpretation, due to Kolm (1971), stresses that an envy-free
allocation is such that it could have arisen by letting each individual choose a bundle
from an identical opportunity set (e.g., the set of bundles in the given allocation).
Envy-freeness is a crude criterion. It distinguishes only two classes of allocations,
those that are envy-free and those that are not. There are good reasons to consider envy
measures that provide more discriminatory envy rankings of allocations. Since envy-
freeness generalizes the idea of equality to the setting of ordinal and non-comparable
preferences, the study of envy measures is a natural extension of the theory of inequality
measurement.2 Further, allocations that are both envy-free and Pareto efficient are not
guaranteed to exist in non-transferable-commodities or production settings. Hence,
allocations in the Pareto efficient subset that minimize an envy measure constitute
interesting compromises.3 Similarly, in the problem of allocating indivisible objects
when money transfers are allowed, there is no allocation rule that is envy-free, strategy-
proof and budget-balanced. Again, an envy measure can be used to choose among the
strategy-proof and budget-balanced allocation rules.4
We introduce a new class of envy measures. Throughout, we discuss the connections
with envy measures proposed by Feldman and Kirman (1974), Chaudhuri (1986),
Diamantaras and Thomson (1989), Tadenuma and Thomson (1995) and Fleurbaey
(2008). Whereas these previous envy measures were proposed on the basis of their
direct appeal, we use an axiomatic approach in order to make intuitions explicit. We
develop our class in two steps.
First, we examine the consequences of imposing decomposability. This axiom
requires that, for each partitioning of the population in two subgroups, envy in the
total population can be written as the sum of the envy within subgroups and the envy
between subgroups. In combination with a basic normalization axiom, decompos-
ability implies that envy is measured by
∑
i
∑
j Ei j , where Ei j measures how much
1 The seminal references are Tinbergen (1946), Foley (1967), Kolm (1971) and Varian (1974). See
Arnsperger (1994) and Thomson (2011) for surveys. Note that the term ‘envy’ as we use it should be
distinguished sharply from its everyday use, where the term designates the negative feeling aroused by
another’s good fortune. Indeed, an individual may well be envious in our sense without experiencing this
negative feeling. Many authors have addressed this terminological issue. See, in particular, Varian (1974,
pp. 66–67) and Kolm (1971, 1995).
2 Note that if there is only one commodity, say income, then the equal income distribution is the unique
envy-free allocation. See Temkin (1986, 1993) and Ebert and Cowell (2004) for approaches to income
inequality measurement that explicitly refer to envy-freeness.
3 Tadenuma (2002) studies this compromise solution in a formal setting similar to ours. In addition, he
shows that the binary relation that naturally extends this solution (for any two allocations, prefer the Pareto
dominant allocation if there is Pareto dominance, and prefer the envy-minimizing allocation if there is no
Pareto dominance) violates the essential property of transitivity. Transitive binary relations that combine the
Pareto principle and alternative equity principles have been proposed by, among others, Fleurbaey (2007)
and Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2008, 2011).
4 Andersson et al. (2014) and Fujinaka and Wakayama (2015) propose allocation rules that are minimally
manipulable among all envy-free and budget-balanced rules. We are not aware of studies that choose among
the strategy-proof and budget-balanced rules by minimizing envy.
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individual i envies individual j and depends only on the bundles of i and j and the
preferences of i . The value of Ei j is zero if i does not envy j , and positive otherwise.
Second, we formulate two axioms, betweenness and proportionality, that deal with
envy comparisons in the simple two-individual setting. Assume that the two individuals
are i and j , and that i envies j but not vice versa. Betweenness demands that envy
decreases if i’s bundle improves or if j’s bundle worsens according to i’s preferences.
Proportionality requires that, for cases where the bundles of individuals i and j are
proportional to each other, envy is smaller if the radial distance between the bundles is
smaller. We show that betweenness and proportionality are incompatible. We weaken
the latter axiom to r -proportionality, which applies the idea of proportionality only
if the bundles of i and j are proportional to a predetermined reference bundle r .
Given anonymity, the axioms betweenness and r -proportionality imply that Ei j is an
increasing function of the ratio ui (x j )/ui (xi ), where xi and x j are the bundles of
individuals i and j and ui is a ‘ray’ utility representation of i’s ordinal preferences.
The ray utility function depends on the chosen reference bundle r and is singled out
by the axioms as the utility representation to be used.
The next section introduces notation and provides an overview of the envy measures
proposed in the literature. Sections 3 and 4 tackle the two steps discussed above.
Section 5 combines the two steps into a single class of envy measures and discusses
its properties. Section 6 concludes with a brief discussion of the connection with
multidimensional inequality measurement.
2 Preliminaries
The set of individuals is N , a finite subset of the set of positive integers. We assume
that N has at least two members. Each individual i in N has a commodity bundle xi in
X = Rm++ and a preference relation Ri on X . The expression x Ri y means that bundle
x is at least as good as bundle y according to individual i . The strict preference relation
corresponding to Ri is denoted by Pi and the indifference relation by Ii . Individual
i is said to envy individual j if x j Pi xi . The set R∗ collects all complete, transitive,
continuous and strictly monotonic preference relations. Each individual i in N has a
preference relation in R∗. Additionally, we will make use of the flat preference relation
R¯, for which x R¯ y for all bundles x and y in X . Because R¯ is indifferent between all
bundles, it never exhibits envy. Whenever we need to focus exclusively on the envy of
a certain individual, we will replace the preference relation of every other individual
by the flat preference relation R¯. The set of all preference relations is R = R∗ ∪ {R¯}.
For a set of individuals N ⊆ N , we let xN = (xi )i∈N and RN = (Ri )i∈N . We refer
to (xN , RN ) as a social state. We do not distinguish between social states that differ
only with respect to the order in which the individuals are listed, e.g., (xi , x j , Ri , R j )
and (x j , xi , R j , Ri ) are treated as the same social state. The set S collects all social
states for each population that can be formed with the individuals in N . That is,
S = ⋃∅=N⊆N X |N | × R|N |.
We are interested in ranking the social states in S on the basis of envy. To this end
we study envy measures. An envy measure is a function E : S → R that associates
with each social state s in S a level of envy E(s).
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We now explain how we use the flat preference R¯ to single out the envy of
one individual. Let s = (xN , RN ) be a social state in S. We consider two coun-
terfactual social states that are induced by s. First, let si denote the social state in
which the preference relation of each individual j = i is replaced by R¯. That is,
si = (x1, . . . , xn, R¯, . . . , R¯, Ri , R¯, . . . , R¯). Second, let si j denote the social state for
the two-individual population {i, j} ⊆ N in which the preference relation of individ-
ual j is replaced by R¯. That is, si j = (xi , x j , Ri , R¯). In social state si , the only envy
that occurs is that which individual i experiences towards all other individuals in N .
Likewise, in social state si j , the only envy that occurs is that which individual i experi-
ences towards individual j . We may therefore interpret E(si ) as the envy experienced
by individual i in social state s and E(si j ) as the envy experienced by individual i
towards individual j in social state s. We will refer to E(si ) as the individual envy of
i and to E(si j ) as the elementary envy that i experiences towards j . Note that E(si )
and E(si j ) are well defined for each envy measure E and each social state s in S.
We define two basic axioms. More axioms will be introduced in the subsequent
sections. Normalization requires the envy measure to attain the value of zero in envy-
free social states and positive values in other social states.5
Normalization For each social state (xN , RN ) in S, we have E(xN , RN ) ≥ 0 with
equality holding if and only if xi Ri x j for all individuals i and j in N .
Anonymity demands that two social states featuring identical bundle-preference
pairs exhibit the same level of envy. These two states may distribute these identical
preference-bundle pairs differently over the same population or over altogether dif-
ferent populations (of the same size). For a bijection π : N → M , and a social state
(xN , RN ), we write π(xN ) for (xπ(i))i∈N and π(RN ) for (Rπ(i))i∈N .
Anonymity For each social state (xN , RN ) in S and each bijection π : N → M , we
have E(xN , RN ) = E(π(xN ), π(RN )).
To put the analysis of the next sections into perspective, we consider several envy
measures that have been proposed in the literature. None of these measures has received
axiomatic foundations. Each measure has been motivated instead by its immediate
intuitive appeal. Table 1 presents the envy measures proposed by Feldman and Kirman
(1974), Chaudhuri (1986) and Diamantaras and Thomson (1989).6 The table also
shows how the measures fare with respect to our axioms.
All five measures rely on elementary envy as a basic building block. For the first
four measures in Table 1, overall envy E(s) equals the sum of all elementary envy
values
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N E(si j ). For the final measure in the table, overall envy E(s) equals
5 In Sect. 5, we discuss an alternative normalization axiom, according to which the envy measure takes its
minimum value only if all individuals are indifferent between all bundles.
6 Our formulation of the Diamantaras–Thomson measure follows Arnsperger (1994, Definition 5.4).
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the maximum elementary envy maxi, j∈N E(si j ).7 Let us focus now on how each of
the measures defines elementary envy.
For the first Feldman–Kirman measure, which is a simple count of the instances
of envy, the elementary envy E(si j ) equals 1 if individual i envies individual j and 0
if not. The measure clearly neglects the intensity of elementary envy, contrary to the
next four measures in the table.
The second and third Feldman–Kirman measures require the existence of a cardi-
nally significant utility representation of individual preferences. This stands in contrast
to the other envy measures discussed in this section, as well as those developed in the
next sections, which only require ordinal preference information. Let ui be the cardi-
nal utility function of individual i . The elementary envy E(si j ) equals ui (x j )−ui (xi )
for the second Feldman–Kirman measure, and the same value truncated at zero for the
third Feldman–Kirman measure. Hence, the former measure takes into account ‘neg-
ative’ elementary envy, i.e., the extent to which an individual prefers his own bundle
to that of another, whereas the latter measure does not.8 A shortcoming of these two
measures is the need for cardinal utility information.
The Chaudhuri and Diamantaras–Thomson measures focus on the factor λi j by
which the bundle of j has to be shrunk in order for i to stop envying j . For the
Diamantaras–Thomson measure, elementary envy E(si j ) equals (1/λi j ) − 1, where
λi j is such that xi Ii λi j x j . For the Chaudhuri measure, elementary envy is the
same value truncated at zero. Again, the Diamantaras–Thomson measure takes into
account ‘negative’ elementary envy, whereas the Chaudhuri measure does not. A
shortcoming of these two measures is their arbitrary dependence on the particular
procedure of shrinking the bundle of the envied. An a priori equally appealing pro-
cedure would be to focus on the factor by which the bundle of the envious has to be
expanded in order for him to stop envying, but this procedure yields different results
(see Sect. 4).
We proceed as follows. In Sect. 3 we characterize an envy measure that equates
overall envy to the sum of all elementary envy values. The measure takes the form of
the first four measures in Table 1. Measures that equate overall envy to the maximum
elementary envy, as the Diamantaras–Thomson measure, or to the minimum elemen-
tary envy may be obtained as limiting cases (see Sect. 5). In Sect. 4 we consider axioms
that impose properties on an envy measure only for the two-individual case. Using
these axioms we characterize a measure of elementary envy that combines features
of the utility difference approach of the second and third Feldman–Kirman measures
7 Hence, the five measures in Table 1 depend only indirectly on individual envy. The individual envy
experienced by i towards all other individuals in N equals E(si ) =
∑
j∈N E(si j ) for the first four measures
in the table and E(si ) = max j∈N E(si j ) for the final measure. In Sect. 5 we discuss measures by Tadenuma
and Thomson (1995) and Fleurbaey (2008) that give a more substantial role to individual envy.
8 Feldman and Kirman (1974, p. 997) introduce their third measure with the explicit objective to not
attribute positive ethical value to ‘negative’ elementary envy: “The [second] measure . . . has the property
that a man who isn’t on the bottom rung of the economic ladder is compensated (in envy) by the misfortune
of those below him. Such compensation may not seem entirely natural . . .”. As we will see in Sect. 3, jointly,
the axioms normalization and decomposability fully eliminate the role of ‘negative’ elementary envy. In
Sect. 5, we discuss an alternative approach that does give a role to ‘negative’ envy, but a negative rather
than a positive role.
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and of the radial distance approach of the Chaudhuri and Diamantaras–Thomson mea-
sures. But at the same time the measure avoids the shortcomings of these approaches.
Section 5 combines the results of the two preceding sections into a single class of envy
measures and discusses its properties.
3 Envy as the sum of elementary envy values
Imagine a partitioning of the population into two subgroups, e.g., on the basis of
region, ethnicity or sex. A standard question in the theory of inequality measurement
applies here as well: how much of the overall envy in the population can be attributed
to the envy within each of the two subgroups and how much to the envy between the
two subgroups? The axiom decomposability requires that overall envy equals the sum
of within-subgroup envy W and between-subgroup envy B.9
Decomposability For each social state (xN , RN ) in S and each partition {N1, N2} of
N with non-empty N1 and N2, we have
E(xN , RN ) = W + B,
where
W = E (xN1 , RN1
) + E (xN2 , RN2
)
and
B =
∑
i∈N1
E
(
xi , xN2 , Ri , R¯, . . . , R¯
) +
∑
i∈N2
E
(
xi , xN1 , Ri , R¯, . . . , R¯
)
.
The within-subgroup term W is itself the sum of the two subgroup envy values. The
between-subgroup term B measures the envy the members of one group experience
towards the members of the other group and vice versa. Consider the first term in
B. Because the preference relations of the members of N2 are replaced by the flat
preference relation R¯, the value E(xi , xN2 , Ri , R¯, . . . , R¯) singles out the envy that
individual i experiences towards the members of N2. The first term in B sums these
values over all i in N1. The term can therefore be interpreted as the envy experienced
by the members of N1 towards the members of N2. The second term in B similarly
computes the envy experienced by the members of N2 towards the members of N1.
The following lemma says that if an envy measure satisfies normalization and
decomposability, then it measures individual envy by the sum of the individual’s
elementary envy values.
9 For decomposability requirements in the theory of income inequality measurement, see, e.g., Bourguignon
(1979), Cowell (1980) and Shorrocks (1980, 1984). The decomposability axiom used here most resembles
that of Ebert (2010). While we, as is customary, state the axiom in terms of two subgroups, repeated
application of the axiom allows a decomposition in any number of subgroups.
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Lemma 1 If E satisfies normalization and decomposability, then, for each social state
(xN , RN ) in S and each individual i in N, we have
E(si ) =
∑
j∈N
E(xi , x j , Ri , R¯).
Proof The proof is by induction on the number of individuals.
Step 1 Let N be such that |N | = 2. Without loss of generality, let N = {i1, i2}. Let
s = (xi1 , xi2 , Ri1 , Ri2) be a social state. Then,
E(si1) = E(xi1 , xi2 , Ri1 , R¯).
Step 2 Suppose the hypothesis holds for all N such that |N | = n with n ≥ 2. We have
to show that it holds for all social states with n + 1 individuals.
Let N ′ be such that |N ′| = n + 1 and let s = (xN ′ , RN ′) be a social state. Without
loss of generality, let N ′ = {i1, i2, . . . , in+1}. Consider the partitioning of N ′ into
N ′1 = {i1, i2, . . . , in} and N ′2 = {in+1}. By decomposability,
E
(
si1
) = E
(
xN ′1 , Ri1 , R¯, . . . , R¯
)
+ E (xin+1 , R¯
)
+ E (xi1 , xin+1 , Ri1 , R¯
) +
n∑
k=2
E
(
xik , xin+1 , R¯, R¯
)
+ E
(
xin+1 , xN ′1 , R¯, . . . , R¯
)
.
The second, fourth and final terms are equal to zero by normalization. Hence,
E(si1) = E
(
xN ′1 , Ri1 , R¯, . . . , R¯
)
+ E (xi1 , xin+1 , Ri1 , R¯
)
.
By the induction hypothesis,
E
(
xN ′1 , Ri1 , R¯, . . . , R¯
)
=
n∑
k=1
E
(
xi1 , xik , Ri1 , R¯
)
.
Hence,
E(si1) =
n+1∑
k=1
E
(
xi1 , xik , Ri1 , R¯
)
.
unionsq
The following proposition says that an envy measure satisfies normalization and
decomposability if and only if overall envy equals the sum of all elementary envy
values.
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Proposition 1 An envy measure E satisfies normalization and decomposability if and
only if, for each social state (xN , RN ) in S, we have
E (xN , RN ) =
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N
E
(
xi , x j , Ri , R¯
)
,
where E(xi , x j , Ri , R¯) ≥ 0 for all individuals i and j in N with equality holding if
and only if xi Ri x j .
Proof It is easy to see that the stated envy measure satisfies normalization and decom-
posability. We focus on the reverse implication. The proof is by induction on the
number of individuals.
Step 1 Let N be such that |N | = 2. Without loss of generality, let N = {i1, i2}. Let
s = (xi1 , xi2 , Ri1 , Ri2) be a social state. By decomposability,
E(s) = E (xi1 , Ri1
) + E (xi2 , Ri2
)
+ E (xi1 , xi2 , Ri1 , R¯
) + E (xi2 , xi1 , Ri2 , R¯
)
.
The first and second terms are equal to zero by normalization. Hence,
E(s) = E (xi1 , xi2 , Ri1 , R¯
) + E (xi2 , xi1 , Ri2 , R¯
)
.
Step 2 Suppose the hypothesis holds for all N such that |N | = n with n ≥ 2. We have
to show that it holds for all social states with n + 1 individuals.
Let N ′ be such that |N ′| = n + 1 and let s = (xN ′ , RN ′) be a social state. Without
loss of generality, let N ′ = {i1, i2, . . . , in+1}. Consider the partitioning of N ′ into
N ′1 = {i1, i2, . . . , in} and N ′2 = {in+1}. By decomposability,
E(s) = E
(
xN ′1 , RN ′1
)
+ E (xin+1 , Rin+1
)
+
n∑
k=1
E
(
xik , xin+1 , Rik , R¯
) + E
(
xin+1 , xN ′1 , Rin+1 , R¯, . . . , R¯
)
.
The second term is equal to zero by normalization. Using, in addition, the induction
hypothesis,
E(s) =
n∑
k=1
n∑
=1
E
(
xik , xi , Rik , R¯
)
+
n∑
k=1
E
(
xik , xin+1 , Rik , R¯
) + E
(
xin+1 , xN ′1 , Rin+1 , R¯, . . . , R¯
)
.
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By Lemma 1,
E
(
xin+1 , xN ′1 , Rin+1 , R¯, . . . , R¯
)
=
n+1∑
k=1
E
(
xin+1 , xik , Rin+1 , R¯
)
.
Hence,
E(s) =
n+1∑
k=1
n+1∑
=1
E
(
xik , xi , Rik , R¯
)
.
unionsq
Proposition 1 says that overall envy equals the sum of all elementary envy values,
but largely leaves open how to measure elementary envy. All it imposes in this respect
is that ‘negative’ elementary envy, i.e., the extent to which an individual prefers his
own bundle to that of another, is not taken into account. In the next section, we will
consider axioms that give more substantial content to the concept of elementary envy.
4 Measuring elementary envy
Consider a setting with two individuals. We single out the envy that one individual
experiences towards the other by replacing the latter’s preference relation with the flat
preference R¯. We propose axioms that require the envy measure to react to simple
changes in the bundles of the two individuals. The axioms bear on the envy measure
E , but only directly impose properties on the elementary envy measure corresponding
to E .
Betweenness requires the elementary envy that individual i experiences towards
individual j to decrease if i’s bundle improves or j’s bundle worsens according
to i’s preferences. In terms of i’s preferences, the new bundles lie ‘in between’
the original bundles. Figure 1 depicts an example where betweenness implies that
E(xi , x j , Ri , R¯) > E(x ′i , x ′j , Ri , R¯).
Betweenness For all individuals i and j in N , all bundles xi , x j , x ′i and x ′j in X and
each preference relation Ri in R such that x j Pi xi , we have that x j Ri x ′j , x ′j Ri x ′i
and x ′i Ri xi imply E(xi , x j , Ri , R¯) ≥ E(x ′i , x ′j , Ri , R¯) with strict inequality holding
whenever x j Pi x ′j or x ′i Pi xi .
We emphasize an implication of betweenness. Let ui be an arbitrary utility rep-
resentation of the preference relation Ri . Betweenness implies that the elementary
envy E(xi , x j , Ri , R¯) experienced by individual i towards j can be expressed as a
function only of the utility levels ui (xi ) and ui (x j ). That is, if ui (xi ) = ui (x ′i ) and
ui (x j ) = ui (x ′j ) (as depicted in Fig. 2), then E(xi , x j , Ri , R¯) = E(x ′i , x ′j , Ri , R¯).
Note that the second and third Feldman–Kirman measures are in this functional form
and satisfy betweenness.
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Fig. 1 Betweenness implies
E(xi , x j , Ri , R¯) >
E(x ′i , x ′j , Ri , R¯)
Fig. 2 Two clashing radial
distance approaches
The next axiom captures the idea of gauging elementary envy by the radial dis-
tance between bundles. Consider two approaches. The first approach, as adopted in
the Chaudhuri and Diamantaras–Thomson measures, measures the elementary envy
experienced by i towards j using the factor λi j by which j’s bundle has to be shrunk in
order for i to stop envying j . That is, λi j is such that xi Ii λi j x j , and the higher λi j , the
lower the elementary envy of i . The second approach measures the elementary envy
experienced by i towards j using the factor κi j by which i’s bundle has to be expanded
in order for i to stop envying j . That is, κi j is such that κi j xi Ii x j , and the higher κi j ,
the higher the elementary envy of i . The two approaches are a priori equally appealing,
but yield conflicting results.10 To see this, consider the social states s = (xi , x j , Ri , R¯)
and s′ = (x ′i , x ′j , Ri , R¯) in Fig. 2. The first approach implies E(s) < E(s′) because
λi j > λ′i j , whereas the second approach implies E(s) > E(s′) because κi j > κ ′i j .11
We do not make a choice among the two conflicting approaches. Instead, we for-
mulate an axiom that is sufficiently weak to be consistent with both. The axiom only
considers the cases where the bundles of the envied and envious are proportional to
each other and says that a decrease of the radial distance between these two bundles
10 Tadenuma and Thomson (1995, p. 197) make a similar observation.
11 The two approaches do give the same result if the preference relation is homothetic.
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Fig. 3 Betweenness and
proportionality clash
reduces elementary envy. In these cases λi j = 1/κi j and the two above approaches
coincide.
Proportionality For all individuals i and j in N , all bundles xi , x j , x ′i and x ′j in
X such that κxi = x j and κ ′x ′i = x ′j and all preference relations Ri and R′i in R
such that x j Pi xi and x ′j Pi ′ x ′i , we have that κ ≥ κ ′ implies E(xi , x j , Ri , R¯) ≥
E(x ′i , x ′j , R′i , R¯) with strict inequality holding if and only if κ > κ ′.
However, betweenness and proportionality are incompatible: there is no envy mea-
sure that satisfies both axioms. Consider the social states s = (xi , x j , Ri , R¯) and
s′ = (x ′i , x ′j , Ri , R¯) in Fig. 3. Betweenness implies E(s) > E(s′), whereas propor-
tionality implies E(s) < E(s′) because κi j < κ ′i j .12
We treat betweenness as essential and therefore weaken proportionality. The follow-
ing axiom requires all bundles to be proportional to a predetermined reference bundle
r . Later we will argue that the axiom may be regarded as a minimum weakening of
proportionality that is compatible with betweenness.
r -Proportionality There is a bundle r in X such that the following holds. For all
individuals i and j inN , all bundles xi , x j , x ′i and x ′j in X proportional to r and such that
κxi = x j and κ ′x ′i = x ′j and all preference relations Ri and R′i in R such that x j Pi xi
and x ′j Pi ′ x ′i , we have that κ ≥ κ ′ implies E(xi , x j , Ri , R¯) ≥ E(x ′i , x ′j , R′i , R¯) with
strict inequality holding if and only if κ > κ ′.
Before proceeding, we define the ‘ray’ utility representation. Samuelson (1977),
Pazner (1979), and Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2011), among others, have used this
utility presentation in social welfare analysis with ordinal and non-comparable prefer-
ences.13 Let ρ be a predetermined reference bundle in X . The ray utility level attained
by individual i with bundle xi and preference relation Ri is equal to the real number
uρ(xi , Ri ) such that i is indifferent between the fraction uρ(xi , Ri ) of the bundle ρ
and his own bundle xi . Figure 4 provides an illustration. Formally, for each preference
12 If the domain of preference relations is restricted to homothetic preferences relations, then the two
axioms are compatible.
13 See, e.g., Malmquist (1953) and Kannai (1970) for earlier uses of the ray utility function.
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Fig. 4 The ray utility
representation
relation Ri in R\{R¯} and each bundle xi in X , let uρ(xi , Ri ) be the real number such
that xi Ii uρ(xi , Ri )ρ. Let uρ(xi , R¯) be equal to a positive constant for each bundle
xi in X . Clearly, the function uρ( · , Ri ) is a utility representation of the preference
relation Ri .
The following proposition says that an envy measure satisfies betweenness and r -
proportionality if and only if it measures the elementary envy experienced by individual
i towards j by the ratio of i’s ray utility levels associated with j’s and i’s bundles.
Moreover, the reference bundle ρ that determines the ray utility representation must
be chosen such that ρ = r .
Proposition 2 Let E be an envy measure that satisfies anonymity. Then E satisfies
betweenness and r-proportionality if and only if there exists a strictly increasing
function f : R → R such that, for all individuals i and j in N , all bundles xi and x j
in X and each preference relation Ri in R such that x j Pi xi , we have
E(xi , x j , Ri , R¯) = f
(
ur (x j , Ri )
ur (xi , Ri )
)
.
Proof It is easy to see that the stated envy measure satisfies betweenness and r -
proportionality. We focus on the reverse implication.
Let r be a given bundle in X . Let i and j be individuals in N , let xi , x ′i , x j and x ′j
be bundles in X and let Ri and R′i be preference relations in R such that x j Pi xi and
x ′j P ′i x ′i . We have to show that
E
(
xi , x j , Ri , R¯
) ≥ E
(
x ′i , x ′j , R′i , R¯
)
(1)
if and only if
ur
(
x j , Ri
)
ur
(
xi , Ri
) ≥ ur
(
x ′j , R′i
)
ur
(
x ′i , R′i
) . (2)
Then there exists a strictly increasing function f as stated. Note that f does not depend
on i and j by anonymity.
123
K. Bosmans, Z. E. Öztürk
Let yi , y′i , y j and y′j be bundles in X proportional to r and such that yi Ii xi , y′i I ′i x ′i ,
y j Ii x j and y′j I ′i x ′j . Such bundles exist since Ri and R′i are continuous and strictly
monotonic. Let κ and κ ′ be such that κyi = y j and κ ′y′i = y′j .
Suppose that Eq. (1) holds. We have to show that Eq. (2) holds as well. By
betweenness, we have E(xi , x j , Ri , R¯) = E(yi , y j , Ri , R¯) and E(x ′i , x ′j , R′i , R¯) =
E(y′i , y′j , R′i , R¯). Hence, we obtain E(yi , y j , Ri , R¯) ≥ E(y′i , y′j , R′i , R¯). If κ < κ ′,
then E(yi , y j , Ri , R¯) < E(y′i , y′j , R′i , R¯) by r -proportionality. Hence, it must be that
κ ≥ κ ′. From the definition of ur , it follows that κ = ur (y j , Ri )/ur (yi , Ri ) and
κ ′ = ur (y′j , R′i )/ur (y′i , R′i ). Since ur (x j , Ri )/ur (xi , Ri ) = ur (y j , Ri )/ur (yi , Ri )
and ur (x ′j , R′i )/ur (x ′i , R′i ) = ur (y′j , R′i )/ur (y′i , R′i ), we obtain Eq. (2).
Now, suppose that Eq. (2) holds. We have to show that Eq. (1) holds as well.
Equation (2) implies that κ = ur (y j , Ri )/ur (yi , Ri ) ≥ κ ′ = ur (y′j , R′i )/ur (y′i , R′i ).
Since κ ≥ κ ′, we have E(yi , y j , Ri , R¯) ≥ E(y′i , y′j , R′i , R¯) by r -proportionality.
Using betweenness, we obtain Eq. (1). unionsq
The measure of elementary envy in Proposition 2 shares with the second and third
Feldman–Kirman measures that it depends on the utility distance between the bun-
dles of the envious and the envied. However, the utility representation used is not an
arbitrary choice as in those measures. Rather, the radial distance idea inherent in the
Chaudhuri and Diamantaras–Thomson measures singles out the ray utility represen-
tation.
Note that, for a given individual i , the criterion in Proposition 2 provides a com-
plete ranking of all social states of the form (xi , x j , Ri , R¯). This means that any
further strengthening of r -proportionality in the direction of proportionality will either
lead to conflicts or is already implied by the combination of r -proportionality and
betweenness. In other words, r -proportionality minimally weakens proportionality
while ensuring compatibility with betweenness.
5 Main result and discussion
Our main result characterizes the class of envy measures satisfying normalization,
anonymity, decomposability, betweenness and r -proportionality. The theorem is a
straightforward combination of Propositions 1 and 2.
Theorem 1 An envy measure E satisfies normalization, anonymity, decomposability,
betweenness and r-proportionality if and only if there exists a function f : R++ → R+
with f strictly increasing on the interval (1,+∞) and f (t) = 0 for each t ≤ 1 such
that, for each social state (xN , RN ) in S, we have
E(xN , RN ) =
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N
f
(
ur (x j , Ri )
ur (xi , Ri )
)
. (3)
To understand the role of the function f , it is useful to treat the ray utility ratio
ur (x j , Ri )/ur (xi , Ri ) as a natural cardinalization of the measure of the elementary
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envy experienced by individual i towards individual j . The more convex is f , the
more sensitive is the envy measure E to changes in larger elementary envy values
(as measured by the ray utility ratio) relative to changes in smaller elementary envy
values. Given a sufficiently convex f , the measure that equates overall envy to the
largest elementary envy, as in the Diamantaras–Thomson measure, can be approxi-
mated arbitrarily closely. Similarly, choosing f sufficiently concave delivers the other
extreme that identifies overall envy with the minimum elementary envy.
We end this section by discussing three variants of Theorem 1. First, not all envy
measures that have been proposed take the form of a sum over the elementary envy
values. Fleurbaey’s (2008, Chapter 2) measure equates the individual envy of i to his
maximum elementary envy E(si ) = max j∈N E(si j ) and overall envy to the sum of all
individual envy values E(s) = ∑i∈N E(si ). Reversely, the envy measure underlying
the equal-average-compensation solution of Tadenuma and Thomson (1995) equates
the individual envy of i to the sum of his elementary envy values E(si ) = ∑ j∈N E(si j )
and overall envy to the maximum individual envy E(s) = maxi∈N E(si ).14 These
measures, contrary to the measures in Theorem 1, do not depend only on the elementary
envy values, but also on their distribution over the individuals. Such a genuine role
for the individual envy values can be allowed by replacing decomposability by two
simple positive responsiveness axioms. The first axiom requires individual envy to
increase if at least one individual’s elementary envy increases, other things equal.
The second axiom requires overall envy to increase if at least one individual envy
increases, other things equal. These axioms lead to a general approach that allows
different aggregations for the elementary envy values into individual envy and for the
individual envy values into overall envy. We omit the straightforward formal treatment.
Second, we examine how the measure of elementary envy changes if we focus on
the absolute distance between bundles instead of on the relative distance. The only
change to the assumptions in Sect. 2 is that commodities can take negative or zero
values in addition to positive values. We use 1m to denote the m-vector with a one at
each entry. Consider the following absolute version of r -proportionality. Let xi and
x ′i be bundles such that xi = r + ν1m and x ′i = r + ν1m , and let x j = xi + μ1m and
x ′j = x ′i + μ′1m . Let x j Pi xi and x ′j Pi x ′i . Then, according to the alternative axiom,
μ ≥ μ′ implies E(xi , x j , Ri , R¯) ≥ E(x ′i , x ′j , R′i , R¯) with strict inequality holding if
and only if μ > μ′. Replacing r -proportionality by this alternative axiom in Theorem 1
yields the following class of measures: for each social state (xN , RN ) in S, we have
E(xN , RN ) =
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N
g
(
vr (x j , Ri ) − vr (xi , Ri )
)
, (4)
where vr (xi , Ri ) is the real number such that xi Ii (r + vr (xi , Ri )1m), and g : R → R
is a function with g strictly increasing on the interval (0,+∞) and g(t) = 0 for each
t ≤ 0. Note that vr (·, Ri ) is a utility representation of the preference relation Ri .
14 Tadenuma and Thomson (1995) only compare envy-free social states. What we state here is the natural
application of their proposal to social states that are not envy-free. To measure elementary envy, both
Tadenuma and Thomson (1995) and Fleurbaey (2008) use approaches inspired by Chaudhuri (1986) and
Diamantaras and Thomson (1989).
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The proof involves a simple adaptation of the proof of Proposition 2 and is therefore
omitted.
Third, we discuss a variant of the envy measure that is increasing not only in elemen-
tary envy but also in ‘negative’ elementary envy, i.e., the extent to which an individual
prefers his own bundle to that of another.15 We define an alternative normalization
axiom that requires the envy measure to take its minimum value only if all individuals
are indifferent between all bundles.16 Formally, for each social state (xN , RN ) in S, we
have E(xN , RN ) ≥ 0 with equality holding if and only if xi Ii x j for all individuals i
and j in N . To ensure that overall envy increases with ‘negative’ envy, we define ‘neg-
ative’ versions of betweenness and r -proportionality. Negative betweenness says that,
for all individuals i and j in N , all bundles xi , x j , x ′i and x ′j in X and each preference
relation Ri in R such that xi Pi x j , we have that xi Ri x ′i , x ′i Ri x ′j and x ′j Ri x j imply
E(xi , x j , Ri , R¯) ≥ E(x ′i , x ′j , Ri , R¯) with strict inequality holding whenever xi Pi x ′i
or x ′j Pi x j . Negative r -proportionality says that, for all individuals i and j in N , all
bundles xi , x j , x ′i and x ′j in X proportional to r and such that xi = κx j and x ′i = κ ′x ′j
and all preference relations Ri and R′i in R such that xi Pi x j and x ′i Pi ′ x ′j , we have
that κ ≥ κ ′ implies E(xi , x j , Ri , R¯) ≥ E(x ′i , x ′j , R′i , R¯) with strict inequality holding
if and only if κ > κ ′. If we replace in Theorem 1 normalization by its alternative and
add negative betweenness and negative r -proportionality, then we obtain the following
class of measures: for each social state (xN , RN ) in S, the envy measure E takes the
form in Eq. (3), where the function f : R++ → R+ is strictly decreasing on the
interval (0, 1), strictly increasing on the interval (1,+∞) and f (1) = 0. Again, we
omit the simple proof.
6 Concluding remark
We conclude with a remark on the connection between the measurement of envy and
the so-called two-stage approach to the measurement of multidimensional inequality.17
The two-stage approach has so far only been applied to a setting with homogeneous
preferences,18 but can in principle also be applied to a setting with heterogeneous pref-
erences. The approach computes inequality in two stages: the first stage associates a
utility level to the commodity bundle of each individual, and the second stage applies
a uni-dimensional (income) inequality measure to the obtained vector of utilities. If
preferences are heterogeneous, then envy measurement and the two-stage approach
constitute manifestly distinct approaches to multidimensional inequality measure-
ment. The former distinguishes between social states that are Pareto indifferent, i.e.,
15 The second Feldman–Kirman and Diamantaras–Thomson measures, by contrast, register the presence
of ‘negative’ envy as a reduction of overall envy.
16 We are grateful to a referee for suggesting this axiom.
17 The two-stage approach was introduced by Maasoumi (1986). See Dardanoni (1995), Weymark (2006)
and Bosmans et al. (2015) for discussions of the approach.
18 While contributions to the literature on multidimensional inequality measurement do not always explic-
itly define preferences, an interpretation in terms of (homogeneous) preferences is usually valid (see e.g.,
Tsui 1995, pp. 252–253).
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social states between which all individuals are indifferent, whereas the latter does
not.19
However, if preferences are homogeneous, i.e., Ri = R for each individual i , then
the envy measures in Eqs. (3) and (4) produce particular two-stage inequality measures.
The first stage computes the utility vectors, (ur (xi , Ri ))i∈N for (3) and (vr (xi , Ri ))i∈N
for (4). For the second stage, it is easy to obtain well-known unidimensional inequality
measures such as the absolute Gini index, the variance and the variance of logarithms
as special cases of Eqs. (3) or (4).20
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